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Abstract
Machine-learning algorithms trained on features extracted from static code analysis can successfully detect Android
malware. However, these approaches can be evaded by sparse evasion attacks that produce adversarial malware samples
in which only few features are modified. This can be achieved, e.g., by injecting a small set of fake permissions and system
calls into the malicious application, without compromising its intrusive functionality. To improve adversarial robustness
against such sparse attacks, learning algorithms should avoid providing decisions which only rely upon a small subset
of discriminant features; otherwise, even manipulating some of them may easily allow evading detection. Previous work
showed that classifiers which avoid overemphasizing few discriminant features tend to be more robust against sparse
attacks, and have developed simple metrics to help identify and select more robust algorithms. In this work, we aim
to investigate whether gradient-based attribution methods used to explain classifiers’ decisions by identifying the most
relevant features can also be used to this end. Our intuition is that a classifier providing more uniform, evener attributions
should rely upon a larger set of features, instead of overemphasizing few of them, thus being more robust against sparse
attacks. We empirically investigate the connection between gradient-based explanations and adversarial robustness on a
case study conducted on Android malware detection, and show that, in some cases, there is a strong correlation between
the distribution of such explanations and adversarial robustness. We conclude the paper by discussing how our findings
may thus enable the development of more efficient mechanisms both to evaluate and to improve adversarial robustness.
Keywords: Adversarial Machine Learning, Adversarial Robustness, Android Malware, Explainable Artificial
Intelligence, Interpretability
1. Introduction
Machine learning systems are nowadays being exten-
sively adopted in computer security applications, such as
network intrusion and malware detection, as they obtained
remarkable performances even against the increasing com-
plexity of modern attacks [1–3]. More recently, learning-
based techniques based on static analysis proved to be
especially effective at detecting Android malware, which
constitutes one of the major threats in mobile security. In
particular, these approaches showed great accuracy even
when traditional code concealing techniques (such as static
obfuscation) are employed [4–7].
Despite the successful results reported by such ap-
proaches, the problem of detecting malware created to fool
learning-based systems is still far from being solved. The
robustness of machine-learning models is challenged by the
creation of the so-called adversarial examples, i.e., mali-
cious files that receive fine-grained modifications oriented
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Email address: marco.melis@unica.it (Marco Melis)
to deceive the learning-based algorithms [8–11]. In par-
ticular, recent work concerning Android malware demon-
strated that specific changes to the contents of malicious
Android applications might suffice to change their classi-
fication (e.g., from malicious to benign) [6, 12]. The main
characteristic of these attacks is their sparsity, meaning
that they enforce only a few changes to the whole feature
set to be effective. Such changes may be represented by,
e.g., the injection of unused permissions or parts of un-
reachable/unused executable code. For example, adding a
component that is loaded when the application is started
(through a keyword called LAUNCHER) can significantly in-
fluence the classifier’s decision [13].
One of the many reasons why such attacks are so ef-
fective is that classifiers typically assign significant rele-
vance to a limited amount of features (this phenomenon
has also been demonstrated in other applications such as
email spam filtering). As a possible countermeasure, re-
search showed that classifiers that avoid overemphasizing
specific features, weighting them more evenly, can be more
robust against such attacks [6, 14, 15]. Simple metrics
characterizing this behavior were proposed to identify and
select more robust algorithms, especially in the context
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of linear classifiers, where feature weights can be used
as a direct measure of a feature’s relevance to each de-
cision [6, 16, 17]. In parallel, the ability to understand the
classifiers behavior by looking to the input gradient, i.e.
the feature weights in the case of linear classifiers, was also
explored by multiple works in the field of explainable ma-
chine learning [18–21]. In particular, it became of interest
to figure out if the information provided by these gradient-
based methods can also be employed to understand (and
improve) the robustness of learning-based systems against
attacks [22].
In this paper, we investigate the possible correlations be-
tween gradient-based explanations, i.e. attributions, and
the classifiers robustness to adversarial evasion attacks on
an Android malware detection case study. We first pro-
vide a description of learning-based systems for Android
malware detection (Section 2) and their adversarial vul-
nerabilities (Section 3). Then, motivated by the intuition
that the classifiers whose attributions are more evenly dis-
tributed should also be the more robust, as they rely on a
broader set of features for the decision, we propose and em-
pirically validate few synthetic metrics that allow correlat-
ing between the evenness of gradient-based explanations
and the adversarial robustness, a new measure we propose
to represent the classifier robustness to adversarial attacks
along with an increasing attack power in a compact way
(Section 4). We assess our findings on Drebin, a popular
learning-based detector for Android (Section 5). Our in-
vestigation unveils that, under some circumstances, there
is a clear relationship between the distribution of gradient-
based explanations and the adversarial robustness of An-
droid malware detectors. After a brief description of many
related works on adversarial attacks and explainable ma-
chine learning (Section 6), we conclude the paper with
a discussion on how our findings can pave the way to-
wards the development of more efficient mechanisms both
to evaluate adversarial robustness and to defend against
adversarial Android malware examples (Section 7).
2. Android Malware Detection
Here we provide some background on the structure of
Android applications, and then we describe Drebin [4], the
Android malware detector that we consider in our case
study.
2.1. Background on Android
Android applications are compressed in apk files, i.e.,
archives that contain the following elements: (a) the
AndroidManifest.xml file; (b) one or more classes.dex
files; (c); resource and asset files, such as native li-
braries or images; (d) additional xml files that define
the application layout. Since Drebin only analyzes the
AndroidManifest.xml and the classes.dex files, we
briefly describe them below.
manifest dexcode
S1 Hardware components S5 Restricted API calls
S2 Requested permissions S6 Used permission
S3 Application components S7 Suspicious API calls
S4 Filtered intents S8 Network addresses
Table 1: Overview of feature sets.
Android Manifest (manifest). The basic infor-
mation about the Android application is held in the
AndroidManifest.xml, including its package name or the
supported API levels, together with the declaration of its
components, i.e., parts of code that perform specific ac-
tions. For example, one component might be associated
with a screen visualized by the user (activity) or to the ex-
ecution of background tasks (services). App components
can also perform actions (through receivers) on the occur-
rence of specific events, e.g., a change in the device’s con-
nectivity status (CONNECTIVITY CHANGE) or the opening
of an application (LAUNCHER). The manifest also contains
the list of hardware components and permissions requested
by the application to work (e.g., Internet access).
Dex bytecode (dexcode). The classes.dex file embeds
the compiled source code of the applications, including
all the user-implemented methods and classes; the byte-
code can be executed with the Dalvik Virtual Machine
(until Android 4.4) or the Android runtime (ART). The
classes.dex may contain specific API calls that can ac-
cess sensitive resources such as personal contacts (suspi-
cious calls). Additionally, it contains all system-related,
restricted API calls that require specific permissions (e.g.,
writing to the device’s storage). Finally, this file can con-
tain references to network addresses that might be con-
tacted by the application.
2.2. Drebin
The majority of the approaches for Android malware
detection employ static and dynamic analyses that ex-
tract information such as permissions, communications
through Inter-Component Communication (ICC), system-
and user-implemented API calls, and so forth [4, 5, 7, 23,
24].
Drebin is among the most popular and used static de-
tection approaches. It performs the detection of Android
malware through static analysis of Android applications.
In a first phase (training), it employs a set of benign
and malicious apps provided by the user to determine
the features that will be used for detection (meaning that
the feature set will be strictly dependent on the training
data). Such features are then embedded into a sparse,
high-dimensional vector space. Then, after the training
of a linear machine-learning model, the system is able to
perform the classification of previously-unseen apps. An
overview of the system architecture is given in Figure 1,
and discussed more in detail below.
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Classification label: malware
Detection score: +1.92
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0.45 PERMISSION:SEND_SMS
0.45 INTENT:SMS_RECEIVED
...
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Figure 1: A schematic representation ([6]) of Drebin. First, applications are represented as binary vectors in a d-dimensional feature space. A
linear classifier is then trained on an available set of malware and benign applications, assigning a weight to each feature. During classification,
unseen applications are scored by the classifier by summing up the weights of the present features: if f(x) ≥ 0, they are classified as malware.
Drebin also explains each decision by reporting the most suspicious (or benign) features present in the app, along with the weight assigned
to them by the linear classifier [4].
Feature extraction. First, Drebin statically analyzes
a set of n training Android applications to construct a
suitable feature space. All features extracted by Drebin
are presented as strings and organized in 8 different feature
sets, as listed in Table 1.
Android applications are then mapped onto the feature
space as follows. Let us assume that an app is represented
as an object z ∈ Z, being Z the abstract space of all
apk files. We denote with Φ : Z 7→ X a function that
maps an apk file z to a d-dimensional feature vector x =
(x1, . . . , xd)> ∈ X = {0, 1}d, where each feature is set to
1 (0) if the corresponding string is present (absent) in the
apk file z. An application encoded in feature space may
thus look like the following:
x = Φ(z) 7→

· · ·
0
1
· · ·
1
0
· · ·

· · · }
S2
permission::SEND SMS
permission::READ SMS
· · · }
S5
api call::getDeviceId
api call::getSubscriberId
· · ·
Learning and Classification. Drebin uses a linear Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) to perform detection. It can
be expressed in terms of a linear function f : X 7→ R, i.e.,
f(x) = w>x + b, where w ∈ Rd denotes the vector of
feature weights, and b ∈ R is the so-called bias. These pa-
rameters, optimized during training, identify a hyperplane
that separates the two classes in the feature space. During
classification, unseen apps are then classified as malware
if f(x) ≥ 0, and as benign otherwise. In this work, we
will also consider other linear and nonlinear algorithms to
learn the classification function f(x).
Explanation. Drebin explains its decisions by reporting,
for any given application, the most influential features, i.e.,
the ones that are present in the given application and are
assigned the highest absolute weights by the classifier. The
feature relevance values reported by Drebin correspond ex-
actly to its feature weights, being Drebin a linear classifier.
For instance, in Figure 1 it is possible to see that Drebin
correctly identifies the sample as malware since it connects
to a suspicious URL and uses SMS as a side-channel for
communication. In this work, we use different state-of-the-
art explainability methods to measure feature relevance
and evaluate whether and to which extent the distribu-
tion of relevance values reveals any interesting insight on
adversarial robustness.
3. Adversarial Android Malware
Machine learning algorithms are known to be vulnerable
to adversarial examples. The ones used for Android mal-
ware detection do not constitute an exception. The vulner-
ability of those systems was demonstrated in [6, 17, 25],
and a defense mechanism was proposed in [6]. In this
section, we first explain how an attacker can construct
Android malware able to fool a classifier (Drebin), being
recognized as benign. Then, considering the system called
SecSVM [6] as a case-study, we explain how machine learn-
ing systems can be strengthened against this attack.
3.1. Attacking Android Malware Detection
The goal of creating adversarial Android malware that
evades detection can be formulated as an optimization
problem, as detailed below. This optimization problem
is constrained to ensure that the solution provides a func-
tional and realizable malware sample, i.e., that the feature
changes suggested by the attack algorithm are feasible and
can be implemented as practical manipulations to the ac-
tual apk input file.
Problem Formulation. As explained in the previous
section, Drebin is a binary classifier trained on Boolean
features. To have a malware sample z misclassified as
benign, the attacker should modify its feature vector x
in order to decrease the classifier score f(x). The num-
ber of features considered by Drebin is quite large (more
than one million). However, the attacker can reasonably
change only few of them (sparse attack) to preserve the
malicious functionality of the application. The attacker
has thus an `1-norm constraint on the number of features
that can be modified. The feature vector of the adversar-
ial application can be computed by solving the following
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Algorithm 1 PGD-based attack on Android malware.
Input: x, the input malware; ε, the number of features
which can be modified; η, the step size; Π, a projection
operator on the constraints (2) and (3); t > 0, a small
number to ensure convergence.
Output: x′, the adversarial (perturbed) malware.
1: x′ ← x
2: repeat
3: x? ← x′
4: x′ ← Π(x? − η · ∇f(x?))
5: until |f(x′)− f(x?)| ≤ t
6: return: x′
optimization problem:
arg min
x′
f(x′) (1)
s.t. ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ ε (2)
xlb  x′  xub (3)
x′ ∈ {0, 1} , (4)
where Eq. (2) is the `1 distance constraint between the
original x and the modified (adversarial) x′ sample.
Eq. (3) is a box constraint that enforces the features values
of the adversarial malware to stay within some lower and
upper bounds, while Eq. (4) enforces the attack to find
a Boolean solution. The aforementioned problem can be
solved with gradient-based optimization techniques, e.g.,
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), as described in Algo-
rithm 1 [9, 17, 26]. At each step, this algorithm projects
the feature values of the adversarial sample onto the con-
straints (Eqs. 2-3), including binarization in {0, 1}.
Feature Addition. To create malware able to fool the
classifier, an attacker may, in theory, both adding and
removing features from the original applications. How-
ever, in practice, removing features is a non-trivial opera-
tion that can easily compromise the malicious functional-
ities of the application. Feature addition is a safer oper-
ation, especially when the injected features belong to the
manifest; for example, adding permissions does not in-
fluence any existing application functionality. When the
features depend on the dexcode, it is possible to add them
safely introducing information that is not actively exe-
cuted, e.g., by adding code after return instructions (dead
code) or methods that are never called by any invoke type
instructions (i.e., the ones that indicate a method call).
Therefore, in this work, we only consider feature addition.
To find a solution that does not require removing features
from the original application, the attacker can simply de-
fine xlb = x in Eq. (3). However, it is worth mentioning
that this injection could be easily made ineffective, simply
removing all the features extracted from code lines that
are never executed. In this way, the attacker is forced to
change the executed code, which is more difficult, as it
requires considering the following additional and stricter
constraints. Firstly, the attacker should avoid breaking the
application functionalities. Secondly, they should avoid
introducing possible artifacts or undesired functionalities,
which may influence the semantics of the original program.
Injecting a large number of features may be, therefore, dif-
ficult and not always feasible.
3.2. SecSVM: Defending against Adversarial Android
Malware
In [6], the authors showed that the sparse evasion attack
described above is able to fool Drebin, requiring the injec-
tion of a negligible number of features, and they propose a
robust counterpart of that classifier. The underlying idea
behind their countermeasure is to enforcing the classifier
to learn more evenly distribute feature weights since this
will require the attacker to manipulating more features to
evade the classifier. To this end, they added a box con-
straint on the weights w of a linear SVM, obtaining the
following learning algorithm (Sec-SVM):
min
w,b
1
2w
>w + C
∑n
i=1 max (0, 1− yif(xi)) (5)
s.t. wlbk ≤ wk ≤ wubk , k = 1, . . . , d ,
where the lower and upper bounds on w are defined by the
vectors wlb = (wlb1 , . . . , w
lb
d ) and w
ub = (wub1 , . . . , w
ub
d ),
which are application dependent. Eq. (5) can be easily
optimized using a constrained variant of the Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) technique, as described in [6].
4. Do Gradient-based Explanations Help to Un-
derstand Adversarial Robustness?
In this work, we investigate whether gradient-based at-
tribution methods used to explain classifiers’ decisions pro-
vide useful information about the robustness of Android
malware detectors against sparse attacks. Our intuition is
that the classifiers whose attributions are usually evenly-
distributed rely upon a broad set of features instead of
overemphasizing only a few of them. Therefore, they are
more robust against sparse attacks, where the attacker can
change only a few features, having a negligible impact on
the classifier decision function. To verify our intuition,
we present an empirical analysis whose procedure is il-
lustrated in Figure 2 and described below. Firstly, we
perform a security evaluation on the tested classifier, ob-
taining a compact measure we call Adversarial Robustness
(see Section 4.1), representing its robustness to the adver-
sarial attacks along with an increasing number of added
features . Then, we compute the attributions for each
benign and manipulated malware sample x using a cho-
sen gradient-based explanation technique (see Section 4.2)
obtaining the relevance vectors r. For each of those, we
propose to look for a compact metric that encapsulates the
degree of Evenness of the attributions (see Section 4.3).
Finally, comparing this value with the adversarial robust-
ness, we asses the connections between attributions’ even-
ness and the robustness to adversarial evasion attacks. In
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Section 5, we present the results of our analysis on the
popular learning-based detector for Android Drebin, pro-
viding the empirical evidence of our intuition.
4.1. Adversarial Robustness
We define the robustness to the evasion samples crafted
injecting a fixed number of features  as:
R(Dε, f) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
e−`i , (6)
where `i = `(yi, f(xi)) is the adversarial loss attained by
the classifier f on the data points in Dε = {xi, yi}ni=1,
containing the ε-sized adversarial samples optimized with
Algorithm 1.
We finally define the adversarial robustness R of a clas-
sifier f as the average of R(Dε, f) on different ε:
R = Eε{R(Dε, f)} . (7)
4.2. Gradient-based Explanation Methods
In our analysis, we consider gradient-based attribution
methods, where attribution means the contribution of each
input feature to the prediction of a specific sample. The
positive (negative) value of an attribution indicates that
the classifier considers the corresponding feature as pecu-
liar of the malicious (benign) samples. In the following,
we review the three gradient-based techniques considered
in this work.
Gradient. The simplest method to obtain the attribu-
tions is to compute the gradient of the discriminant func-
tion f with respect to the input sample x. For image
recognition models, it corresponds to the saliency map of
the image [18]. The attribution of the ith feature is com-
puted as:
Gradienti(x) :=
∂f(x)
∂xi
. (8)
Gradient*Input. This technique has been proposed
in [19] and utilized in one of our previous work [13], to
identify the most influential features for an Android mal-
ware detector trained on sparse data. As we have shown
in that paper, this approach is more suitable than the pre-
viously proposed ones when the feature vectors are sparse.
The previously proposed approaches [18, 27] tended to
assign relevance to features whose corresponding compo-
nents are not present in the considered application, thus
making the corresponding predictions challenging to inter-
pret. To overcome this issue, this technique leverages the
notion of directional derivative. Given the input point x,
it projects the gradient ∇f(x) onto x, to ensure that only
the non-null features are considered as relevant for the de-
cision. More formally, the ith attribution is computed as:
Gradient*Inputi(x) :=
∂f(x)
∂xi
∗ xi . (9)
Integrated Gradients. Sundararajan et al. [20] identi-
fied two axioms that attribution methods should satisfy:
implementation invariance and sensitivity. Accordingly
to the first, the attributions should always be identical for
two functionally equivalent networks, e.g. they should be
invariant to the differences in the training hyperparame-
ters, which lead the network to learn the same function.
The second axiom is satisfied if, for every input predicted
differently from a baseline (a reference vector that mod-
els the neutral input, e.g. a black image) and that differs
from the baseline in only one feature, has, for that feature,
a non-zero attribution. In the same paper, they proposed
a gradient-based explanation called Integrated Gradient
that satisfies the axioms explained above. This method,
firstly, considers the straight-line path from the baseline
to the input sample and computes the gradients at all
points along the path. Then, it obtains the attribution
cumulating those gradients. The attribution along the ith
dimension for an input x and baseline x′ is defined as:
IntegratedGradsi(x) :=
(xi − x′i) ·
∫ 1
α=0
∂f (x′ + α · (x− x′))
∂xi
dα .
(10)
To efficiently approximate the previous integral, one can
sum the gradients computed at p fixed intervals along the
joining path from x′ to the input x:
IntegratedGradsapproxi (x) :=
(xi − x′i) ·
p∑
k=1
∂f
(
x′ + kp · (x− x′)
)
∂xi
· 1
p
.
(11)
For linear classifiers, where ∂f/∂xi = wi, this method is
equivalent to Gradient*Input if x′ = 0 is used as a base-
line, which is a well-suited choice in many applications [20].
Therefore, in this particular case, also the Gradient*Input
method satisfies the abovementioned axioms.
4.3. Explanation Evenness Metrics
To compute the evenness of the attributions, we consider
the two metrics, described below. The first is the one
proposed in [14, 15]. To compute the evenness metric, they
firstly defined a function F (r, k) which, given a relevance
vector r, computes the ratio of the sum of the k highest
relevance values to the sum of all absolute relevance values,
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m:
F (r, k) =
∑k
i=1 |r(i)|∑m
j=1 |r(j)|
,
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of the analysis employed to verify the correlation between explanation evenness and adversarial robustness.
First, for each malware in the test set, we create its adversarial counterpart. Then, for each of those adversarial applications, we evaluate:
(1) a measure of the classifier robustness against it (adversarial robustness) (2) the evenness of the application attributions (explanation
evenness). Finally, we asses the correlation between them.
where r1, r2, . . . , rm denote the relevance values, sorted
in descending order of their absolute values, i.e., |r1| ≥
|r2| ≥ . . . ≥ |rm| and m is the number of considered rele-
vance values (m ≤ d). This function essentially computes
the evenness of the distribution of the relevance among
the features. The evenest relevance distribution (the one
where they are all equal), corresponds to F (r, k) = k/n.
Whereas the most uneven is attained when only one rel-
evance differs from zero, and in this case, F (r, k) = 1 for
each k value. To avoid the dependence on k and to obtain
a single scalar value, they compute the evenness as:
E1(r) = 2
m− 1
[
m−
m∑
k=1
F (r, k)
]
. (12)
The range of E1 is [0, 1], E1 = 0 and E1 = 1 indicates
respectively to the most uneven and to the most even rel-
evance vector.
The second metric we consider is the one proposed
in [16], based on the ratio between the `1 and `∞ norm:
E2(r) = 1
m
· ‖r‖1‖r‖∞ . (13)
To have a broader perspective of the attributions even-
ness, we compute the metrics on multiple samples, and we
average the results. More formally, we define the explana-
tion evenness as:
E =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E(ri) , (14)
where ri with i = 1, 2, . . . , n is the relevance vector com-
puted on each sample of a test dataset D = {xi, yi}ni=1,
and E can be equal either to E1 or E2. In the following, we
represent the averaged evenness computed considering the
per-sample metric E1 (E2) with E1 (E2).
5. Experimental Analysis
In this section, we practically evaluate whether the mea-
sures introduced in Section 4 can be used to estimate the
robustness of classifiers against sparse evasion attacks. Af-
ter detailing our experimental setup (Section 5.1), we show
the classifiers’ detection performances, both in normal con-
ditions and under attack (Section 5.2). In our evaluations,
we focus on the feature addition attack setting (see Sec-
tion 3), as they are typically the easiest to accomplish for
the adversary. We use secml as a framework to implement
classification systems, explanation techniques, and attack
algorithms [28]. Finally, we assess the relationship of the
proposed evenness metrics with adversarial robustness and
detection rate (Section 5.3).
5.1. Experimental Setup
Dataset. We use the Drebin dataset [4], consisting of
121, 329 benign applications and 5, 615 malicious samples,
labeled with VirusTotal. A sample is labeled as malicious
if it is detected by at least five anti-virus scanners, whereas
it is labeled as benign otherwise.
Training-validation-test splits. We average our results
on 5 runs. In each run, we randomly selected 60,000 apps
from the Drebin data to train the learning algorithms, and
we used the remaining apps for testing.
Classifiers. We compare the standard Drebin implemen-
tation based on a linear Support Vector Machine (SVM)
against the secured linear SVM from [6] (Sec-SVM), an
SVM with the RBF kernel (SVM-RBF), a logistic regres-
sion (logistic) and a ridge regression (ridge).
Parameter setting. Using a 5-fold cross-validation pro-
cedure, we optimize the parameters of each classifier to
maximize the detection rate (i.e., the fraction of detected
malware) at 1% false-positive rate (i.e., the fraction of le-
gitimate applications misclassified as malware). In par-
ticular, we optimize C ∈ {10−2, 10−1, . . . , 102} for both
linear and non-linear SVMs and logistic, the kernel pa-
rameter γ ∈ {10−4, 10−3, . . . , 102} for the SVM-RBF, and
the parameter α ∈ {10−2, 10−1, . . . , 102} for ridge. For
Sec-SVM, we optimized the parameters −wlb = wub ∈
{0.1, 0.25, 0.5} and C ∈ {10−2, 10−1, . . . , 102}. When sim-
ilar detection rates (±1%) are obtained for different hy-
perparameter configurations, we select the configuration
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Figure 3: (left) Mean ROC curves for the tested classifiers on the Drebin data. (right) White-box evasion attacks on Drebin data. Detection
Rate at 1% False Positive Rate against an increasing number of added features ε. We can see how the Sec-SVM, despite providing a slightly
lower detection rate compared to the other tested classifiers, requires on average more than 25 different new feature additions to the original
apps to be fooled by the attacker.
corresponding to a more regularized classifier, as more reg-
ularized classifiers are expected to be more robust under
attack [17]. The typical values of the aforementioned hy-
perparameters found after cross-validation are C = 0.1 for
SVM, α = 10 for ridge, C = 1 for logistic, C = 1 and
w = 0.25 for Sec-SVM, C = 10 and γ = 0.01 for SVM-
RBF.
Attribution computation We compute the attributions
on 1, 000 malware samples randomly chosen from the
Drebin test set. We took x′ = 0 as the baseline for In-
tegrated Gradients, and we compute the attributions with
respect to the malware class. As a result, positive (neg-
ative) relevance values in our analysis denote malicious
(benign) behavior. Given the high sparsity ration of the
Drebin dataset, we use m = 1, 000 to compute the expla-
nation evenness metrics.
5.2. Experimental Results
We first perform an evaluation of the performances un-
der normal conditions; the resulting Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve with the Detection Rate for
each classifier, averaged over the 5 repetitions, is reported
in the left side of Figure 3. We then perform a white-
box evasive attack against each classifier, aiming to have
1000 malware samples randomly chosen from the Drebin
dataset misclassified as benign. The results are shown on
the right side of Figure 3, which reports the variation of
the detection rate as the number of modified features ε
increases. We can notice how the Sec-SVM classifier (de-
scribed in Section 3.2) provides a slightly worse detection
rate compared to the other classifiers but is particularly
robust against adversarial evasion attacks.
5.3. Is adversarial robustness correlated with explanation
evenness?
We now investigate the connection between adversarial
robustness and evenness of gradient-based explanations.
We start with two illustrative examples. Table 2 shows
the top-10 influential features for two malware samples1
1MD5: f8bcbd48f44ce973036fac0bce68a5d5 (FakeInstaller) and
eb1f454ea622a8d2713918b590241a7e (Plankton).
SVM-RBF (E1 = 46.24%, E2 = 22.47%, εmin = 6)
Set Feature Name r (%)
S2 SEND SMS 10.35
S7 android/telephony/TelephonyManager
;->getNetworkOperator
10.05
S4 LAUNCHER -8.89
S5 android/os/PowerManager$WakeLock
;->release
-8.01
S2 READ PHONE STATE 5.03
S2 RECEIVE SMS -5.00
S3 c2dm.C2DMBroadcastReceiver 4.56
S2 READ SMS 3.52
S4 DATA SMS RECEIVED 3.50
S5 android/app/NotificationManager
;->notify
-3.49
Sec-SVM (E1 = 73.04%, E2 = 66.24%, εmin = 31)
Set Feature Name r (%)
S2 READ PHONE STATE 3.51
S7 android/telephony/TelephonyManager
;->getNetworkOperator
3.51
S2 SEND SMS 3.51
S3 c2dm.C2DMBroadcastReceiver 3.51
S2 INTERNET 3.44
S3 com.software.application.ShowLink 3.39
S3 com.software.application.Main 3.39
S3 com.software.application.Notificator 3.39
S3 com.software.application.Checker 3.39
S3 com.software.application.OffertActivity 3.39
SVM-RBF (E1 = 60.74%, E2 = 25.84%, εmin = 31)
Set Feature Name r (%)
S4 LAUNCHER -1.89
S7 android/net/Uri;->fromFile 1.34
S5 android/os/PowerManager$WakeLock
;->release
-1.25
S2 INSTALL SHORTCUT 1.23
S7 android/telephony/SmsMessage
;->getDisplayMessageBody
-1.21
S7 android/telephony/SmsMessage
;->getTimestampMillis
-1.20
S2 SET ORIENTATION -1.20
S2 ACCESS WIFI STATE 1.15
S4 BOOT COMPLETED 1.08
S5 android/media/MediaPlayer;->start -1.06
Sec-SVM (E1 = 63.14%, E2 = 52.70%, εmin = 39)
Set Feature Name r (%)
S2 ACCESS NETWORK STATE 0.93
S2 READ PHONE STATE 0.93
S6 READ HISTORY BOOKMARKS 0.93
S7 android/telephony/TelephonyManager
;->getNetworkOperatorName
-0.93
S6 ACCESS NETWORK STATE -0.93
S7 android/telephony/SmsMessage;-
>getDisplayOriginatingAddress
0.93
S7 android/telephony/TelephonyManager
;->getNetworkOperator
0.93
S7 android/net/Uri;->getEncodedPath -0.93
S2 SET ORIENTATION -0.93
S7 java/lang/reflect/Method;->invoke 0.93
Table 2: Top-10 influential features and corresponding Gradi-
ent*Input relevance (%) for a malware of the FakeInstaller family
(top) and a malware of the Plankton family (bottom). Notice that
the minimum number of features to add εmin to evade the classifiers
increases with the evenness metrics E1 and E2.
of the FakeInstaller and Plankton families, reported
for the SVM-RBF and Sec-SVM algorithms, and obtained
through the Gradient*Input technique. All the classifiers
correctly label the samples as malware.
Looking at the features of the first sample, the
FakeInstaller malware, we can observe how both the
classifiers identify the cellular- and SMS-related features,
e.g., the GetNetworkOperator() method or the SEND SMS
permission, as highly relevant. This is coherent with the
actual behavior of the malware sample since its goal is to
send SMS messages to premium-rate numbers. With re-
spect to the relevance values, the first aspect to point out
comes from their relative magnitude, expressed as a per-
centage in Table 2. In particular, we can observe that the
top-10 relevance values for SVM-RBF vary, regardless of
their signs, from 3.49% to 10.35%, while for Sec-SVM the
top values lie in the 3.39%–3.51% range. This suggests
that SVM-RBF assigned high prominence to few features;
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Figure 4: Evaluation of the adversarial robustness R against the
evenness E1 (left), E2 (right) metrics for the different gradient-based
explanation techniques computed on 1000 samples of the test set
(only 100 samples are shown).
conversely, Sec-SVM distributed the relevance values more
evenly. It is possible to catch this behavior more easily
through the synthetic evenness measures E1 (Eq. (12)) and
E2 (Eq. (13)) reported in Table 2, which show higher val-
ues for Sec-SVM. Table 2 also shows the εmin value, i.e.,
the minimum number of features to add to the malware to
evade the classifier. We can notice how the εmin param-
eter is strictly related to the evenness distribution, since
higher values of E1 and E2 correspond to higher values of
εmin, i.e., a higher effort for the attacker to accomplish
her goal. In particular, it is possible to identify a clear dif-
ference between the behavior of SVM-RBF and Sec-SVM:
the diversity of their evenness metrics, which cause the
εmin values to be quite different as well, indicates that, for
this prediction, SVM-RBF is quite susceptible to a possi-
ble attack compared to Sec-SVM.
Conversely, considering the second sample, the attri-
butions (regardless of the sign) and the evenness metrics
present similar values. Such behavior is also reflected in
the associated εmin values. In this case, the relevance val-
ues are more evenly distributed, which indicates that the
evasion is more difficult.
We now correlate the evenness metrics with the adver-
sarial robustness R, introduced in Section 4.1. Figure 4
shows the relationship between this value and the evenness
Gradient Gradient*Input Int. Gradients
E1 E2 E1 E2 E1 E2
logistic P
S
K
0.67, <1e-5
0.67, <1e-5
0.51, <1e-5
0.75, <1e-5
0.72, <1e-5
0.54, <1e-5
0.67, <1e-5
0.67, <1e-5
0.51, <1e-5
0.75, <1e-5
0.72, <1e-5
0.54, <1e-5
ridge P
S
K
0.48, <1e-5
0.58, <1e-5
0.41, <1e-5
0.56, <1e-5
0.67, <1e-5
0.49, <1e-5
0.48, <1e-5
0.58, <1e-5
0.41, <1e-5
0.56, <1e-5
0.67, <1e-5
0.49, <1e-5
SVM P
S
K
0.68, <1e-5
0.66, <1e-5
0.49, <1e-5
0.70, <1e-5
0.73, <1e-5
0.54, <1e-5
0.68, <1e-5
0.66, <1e-5
0.49, <1e-5
0.70, <1e-5
0.73, <1e-5
0.54, <1e-5
SVM-RBF P
S
K
0.03, 0.769
0.46, <1e-5
0.34, <1e-5
0.46, <1e-5
0.70, <1e-5
0.51, <1e-5
0.82, <1e-5
0.94, <1e-5
0.81, <1e-5
0.82, <1e-5
0.94, <1e-5
0.80, <1e-5
0.89, <1e-5
0.93, <1e-5
0.78, <1e-5
0.91, <1e-5
0.93, <1e-5
0.77, <1e-5
Sec-SVM P
S
K
0.73, <1e-5
0.76, <1e-5
0.62, <1e-5
0.76, <1e-5
0.78, <1e-5
0.67, <1e-5
0.73, <1e-5
0.76, <1e-5
0.62, <1e-5
0.76, <1e-5
0.78, <1e-5
0.67, <1e-5
Table 3: Correlation between the adversarial robustness R and the
evenness metrics E1 and E2. Pearson (P), Spearman Rank (S),
Kendall’s Tau (K) coefficients along with corresponding p-values.
The linear classifiers lack a correlation value since the evenness is
constant (being the gradient constant as well), thus resulting in a
not defined correlation.
metrics for 100 samples chosen from the test set, reported
for each explainability technique. From this broader view,
we can see how the evenness values calculated on top of
the Gradient*Input and Integrated Gradients explanations
present a significant connection to the adversarial robust-
ness. This seems not to be applicable to the Gradient tech-
nique, and specifically against the linear classifiers, whose
dots in Figure 4 are perfectly vertical-aligned. This fact is
caused by the constant value of the gradient across all the
samples, which implies constant values for the evenness
metrics as well. In order to assess the statistical signif-
icance of this plot, we also compute the associated cor-
relation values with three different metrics: Pearson (P),
Spearman Rank (S), Kendall’s Tau (K). They are shown
in Table 3.
Finally, we inquire whether the connection between the
evenness metrics and the detection performance of a clas-
sifier can provide a global assessment of its robustness.
Figure 5 shows the correlation between the explanation
evenness and the mean detection rate under attack, calcu-
lated for ε in the range [1, 50]. Similarly to the previous
test, Gradient*Input and Integrated Gradients explana-
tions present a significant connection to the adversarial
robustness in most cases, while the Gradient technique
does to a less extent.
6. Related Work
6.1. Adversarial attacks
According to a recent survey by Biggio et al. [8], several
works questioned the security of machine learning since
2004. Two pioneering works were proposed by Dalvi et
al. [29] in 2004 and by Lowd and Meek [30] in 2005. Those
works, considering linear classifiers employed to perform
spam filtering, demonstrated that an attacker could eas-
ily deceive the classifier at test time (evasion attacks) by
performing a limited amount of carefully-crafted changes
to an email. Subsequent works [31–33] proposed attacker
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Figure 5: Evaluation of the evenness metrics E1 (left) and E2 (right)
against the Detection Rate (FPR 1%) for the different gradient-based
explanation techniques computed on the Drebin dataset.
models and frameworks that are still used to study the
security of learning-based systems also against training-
time (poisoning) attacks. The first gradient-based poi-
soning [34] and evasion [9] attacks were proposed by Big-
gio et al. respectively in 2012 and 2013. Notably, in [9]
the authors also introduced two important concepts that
are still heavily used in the adversarial field, namely high-
confidence adversarial examples and the use of a surrogate
model. This work anticipated the discovery of the so-called
adversarial examples against deep neural networks [10, 11].
The vulnerability to evasion attacks was then studied
especially on learning systems designed to detect malware
samples (for example, on PDF files [35, 36]), thus raising
serious concerns about their usability under adversarial
environments. In particular, for Android malware detec-
tors, Demontis et al. [6] demonstrated that linear models
trained on the (static) features extracted by Drebin can
be easily evaded by performing a fine-grained injection of
information (a more advanced injection approach that di-
rectly operates on the Dalvik bytecode has been proposed
by Yang et al. [37]) by employing gradient descent-based
approaches. Grosse et al. [25] have also attained a signif-
icant evasion rate on a neural network trained with the
Drebin feature set. Although the adversarial robustness
of other Android detectors aside from [4] was not fully ex-
plored, it is evident that employing information that can
be easily injected or modified may increase the probability
of the attacker to attain successful evasion.
6.2. Explainability
Consequently to the rise of black-box models in the last
decade, explainability became a hot research topic. It can
be leveraged to achieve multiple goals, from justifying each
prediction (the right of explanation required by the Euro-
pean General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [38]) to
discovering new knowledge and causal relations. Explain-
ability became increasingly popular in security as well, as
providing a proper explanation of predictions can help to
secure the systems against adversarial attacks.
Several approaches for interpretability have been pro-
posed, with a particular attention to post-hoc explanations
for black-box models. In the following, we briefly describe
the prominent explainability methodologies proposed in
this sense. In 2016, Ribeiro et al. [27] proposed LIME,
a model-agnostic technique that provides local explana-
tions by generating small perturbations of the input sam-
ple, thus obtaining the explanations from a linear model
fitted on the perturbed space. Lundberg and Lee [39] uni-
fied different techniques, including LIME, under the name
of SHAP, by leveraging cooperative game theory results
to identify theoretically-sound explanation methods and
provide feature importance for each prediction. Koh and
Liang [40] showed that using a gradient-based technique
called influence functions, which is well known in the field
of robust statistics, it is possible to associate each input
sample to the training samples (prototypes) that are most
responsible for its prediction. The theory behind the tech-
niques proposed by the authors holds only for classifiers
with differentiable loss functions. However, the authors
empirically showed that their technique provides sensible
prototypes also for classifiers with not-differentiable losses
if computed on a smoothed counterpart. Finally, Guo et
al. [41] proposed LEMNA, a method specifically designed
for security tasks, i.e., that is optimized for RNN and MLP
networks, and that highlights the feature dependence (e.g.,
for binary code analysis). We recommend the recent sur-
vey by Guidotti et al. [42] for a more detailed description.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we empirically evaluate the correlation
between multiple gradient-based explanation techniques
and the adversarial robustness of different linear and non-
linear classifiers against sparse evasion attacks. To this
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end, we leverage two synthetic measures of the explana-
tion evenness, which main advantage is not requiring any
computationally-expensive attack simulations. Thus, they
may be used by system designers and engineers to choose,
among a plethora of different models, the one that is most
resilient against sparse attacks.
As we validate the proposed synthetic vulnerability mea-
sure by considering only the Drebin malware detector as
a case study, we plan to inspect other malware detectors
as well as other application domains. Moreover, as the
proposed metrics may be used to estimate the robustness
only against sparse evasion attacks, an interesting research
direction would be to devise a similar measure that can be
used to estimate the robustness when the attack is sub-
jected to different application constraints. Also, it could
be interesting to assess if our vulnerability measures can
be successfully applied when the attacker does not know
the classifier parameters or when the model is not differ-
entiable; in that case, a surrogate classifier would be used
to explain the original unknown model function.
Finally, another interesting research avenue is to modify
the objective functions used to train the considered ma-
chine learning models by adding to them a penalty which
is inversely proportional to the proposed evenness met-
rics, in order to enforce the classifier to learn more evenly
distributed relevance scores and, consequently, the model
robustness.
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